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Denmark -

26th July 1984.

Mrs. Geraldine Ferraro
1725 Longworth House Office Building
Washington DC , 20515
U S A

Dear Mrs. Ferraro,
I take the liberty to write to you in order to send you
the enclosed letter from professor Anderson, University of
Minnesota, to Congressman Paul Simon and the reference to
the "First-Strike capability"-statement by Caspar Weinberger.
According to Robert Aldridge (author of The Counterforce
Syndrome and First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for
Nuclear War) the USA will have a perceived first strike
capability by 1988 - and according to professor Johan
Galtung of the University of Berlin, the US President and
Secretary of Defense can (technically) order a first strike
attack with strategic nuclear weapons on the USSR all alone,
without having to inform or ask other members of the Admini stration, Congress , Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl
or other people .
I think I ought to inform you of that and to send you
the enclos~d papers .
I wish you all the luck in the world in beating Reagan/Bush
(i . e . Reagan/Weinberger , maybe after all) .

Yours sincerely ,
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November 26, 1982
The Honorable Paul Simon
Member of Congress
227 Cannon Rouse Off ice Building
Washington, D. c. 20515

Dear

Congress~an

Simon:

I appreciate very much your letter of October 19 and am sorry
it has taken me so long to respond.
I am glad to hear:- .. that
you have requested that the Government Accoun~ing Cffice begin
an annual review of the dafcnse budget request.
It has been
clear that there has bt~cn too little well support:ccl "loyal
opposition," and n.t the snmc time I rend in Franklin Spinney's
report "Dui'onso Pn.ct~ of JJ.tfn" th~t ln the 111..?ntar;on oftr.11
"hon cs t · c r it i c is rn g ct s con f us c d wit h d is 1 o y :.i l t y . " i\ t t hr
same time some people, even the President, confuse blind
loyalty with patriotism.

As a loyal oppositionist, here is n summary of my view of the
Administration's strntegic program, including Dense Pnck:
I hn.vc grndu:tlly comn to sec clearly thn.t the /\clrninistr:i.tion's
"nuclear wa.r-fightini::"

,

·

str~teg~·

metlr\~

FIRST STRTI-:i::-;- !\.

prr.~m!')t1Ve

attack aimed in one blow at destroying the.Soviet nuclear
.51(.t;i'·i . -~§Q.!S. Herc is why: Two maJor t ct:hn ical prob l<:Jms \~it h fighting
1
d'-J~ft:,,,u,- a nuc~ear war nave been pointed out this past >:ea~ 1n articles
in Science. · 1) E~fP. Th e electromagnetic puls e effect casts a
great deal of <loubt'ot1 the effectiveness of command, control,
communications and intcllegence following a major nuclear atthck,
0 and even following a minor one well placed.
2) Dust. Following
the first attack, there will be enormous amounts of dust in the ~
~
air. Science~. (Sept. ?.5, 1981) pointer! out th:it the A)r For~P
diGcoveretl t1iC cJ fr.ct of du st wh e n one of their jLJts flew th1·ough
the plume of ~it. St. Helens and two of the engines quit. This
effect was seen ngain when a Boc~ing 747 almost crashed near
Jakarta last spring. Conclusion: You can't fly jct aircraft
during a nuclear war with mushroom clouds all over the place.
Not B.... ls, not ·cruise misr:;ile8, not any kind of j0t a .ircr:tft.
.
A thir.d factor is stratc~glc: Doth sicki-; tnlk in tlrnir litt~rn.tur•"
abuut !'dec::ipltation attacks," strik0s on the c c 1H11 ~ind headqua..::ters.
/\n obvious idea; if you c;111 destroy the command posts in the
first wave, possibly no further attacks can be ordered, certainly
fewer than if you donit attack command posts:
3
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The logical military· cone 1 us ion of. :ill of th is i
th::i. t you rcal ly
can't know whnt you will be able to du . after the irst . wurhends
exp lode. . You. bat t .e r prt?~n:r;-~ t9 . hi~ . u.1lJ.'Jt(~ the other !:;idc' s
nuclear fo~c;ff!1}>.b'f!:~~¥·~.i;,hf?·~ietttt1 ·g«t:~:~a.rty . o·f·"i ~t:lf@rtf o~ f th~ t;'t -ou nd
or wa te:r •..\\1'htt~\·/~~tf~ij'.1;,,Nii.v'ih:h".~ ·sai·~tli t:@~ (<YB'f.~ k must · be asstftrt~lJ
des tr6'yed ··thY~tktf·::tf't.~t :~~tU1~ f '.fb·r h1idcbtti~~. ti~t"'rcc t ioll or Tr itlen ts.
Rely on the.bptimistfc.stntements about' very accurate i;uidn.nce
systems on the MX mis·s i 1 cs. But, because of the inissi le f 1 igh t
times of 15 to 30 minut~i, the .Soviets md~ ·still be able to launch
on wnrning of our att:i.ck. ·' This · problem is partially solved. by
placing Pershing II missiles ih Europe where the flight time
to targets in Western USSR is cut to 5 to 7 minutes. As u
f in a 1 st e p , de v c 1 op 8. n ab i 1 i t y to tr r~ ck So v i et s u bm a r i t1 es .
Hobert Aldrich, in his book Counterforce Svhdrome,has detailed
all of this.

,•,

The military iogic is '' appealing: The Cl'trrcnt doctrint~ of
?.lutual Assured Destruction 01.1\D) says · that we will th.t'C?aten
the other side with an attack witich. if car'riccl uut, will destroy
us as well o.~ the n.tt:i.ckr.1·. Jt :i.~ like lrn.vJnr; :t pU.~tol t:o
protect one !rum bur~ulars, whieh if fired kills both the
attacker nnd the attn<~kml.
t11 H\ICh n cn. ~H~, wu woult1 otrnily
dccidt~ .to g~t rid or such n wnnpon.
nut the US and SU have not
been able to do so. · The theoreticians within the Reagan
Administration have recognized this dilcmmu and have proposed
to resolve it by developing a nuclear w~r-fighting strategy.
Un'der~tanding of the three factors I mention above indicate
that waiting for the uth8r slde to strike first really doesn't
resolve the MAD doctrine. J\lso, it is our poliey to hit the
Soviet Union with a nuclear attack i.f th~r tb.i.·c~ten ou.r "vit&l
-- int~rests" With :i conventional :itt::tcl<.
Unlcs::> such :in.a.ltack
destroys virtually all of tl1e Soviet nuclear capability in the
first blow, it is suicidal. Nuclear war figHting can only me:i.n
FIRST STnIKF.. Two vr1·y cnm1wtr.'.!11t. reo'plc hnve to.tel me that in
a meeting for military engineers held at Mitre Corpor~tion in .
Bedford, ~lnss. · in October 1981, Rlclrnrd de Luucr told the audience
thnt "of course the MX and the Trident are not detcreht weapons;
·,· they are preempt i vc st~ ikc wc.a pons !'
~-.
While giving a pruscnt:ttlon to Air Force Secretary Vern Orr an<l
about 15 of his staff in June 1981, one of the colonels usked
me: "Don't you think we wouid be safer with ·first 7 strikc capability
bec:iuse the Soviets woulcl fear loss of thoir mi·l i tary equipment~?"
li I could feel safer, it could only be because I was sure that
~he Soviets neither had first-strike cup:i.bility nor were liable
to get. 1 t for. .n lo n r. t j in o • But if th a t is tr u o , it u n cl c r cuts
the· ar~umcnt give>n puhlic!n.J ly for the ~IX. One rnust eonclutle
that the mil 1 tan: do cf; i nc.10cd want the ~IX as a preempt i v0
strike weapon, in wl1ich case the basing motlc, Dense Puck or
whatever, has no significance. I sec it us ncecssury to the
i\ir Force only because they have spent so mueh of tlwir verbal
caplt:tl convincing people th~l.t the Soviets nre about to strike.
rt is in tcrestitl~

to note that the nrgument for Dense Pack-frutricide--wns use by us severnl years ago ns one or thu many
reasons that u first strike ntt:i.ck on the Minuteman makes no
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sense.

An

nttttc~oh ~ Minut~mun

silo must use sever1tl wntheads

if the kil1 probu.t!f1l!ity,,L\ ~s to be. high, Stl~ the first one to
go off is l '!kdty·:,..t·Oii-id·~~t:;;cb.11~-:;tktt otttars '.· 1:nl!.td·t~ they cfitt de~tro;J
tht! :s i loj ~;.,..:~b. ~~1 ~·fp~~fottl'l:,y1·~:t¥f~¥ :~atfqur_ f16l''. of:{_t~1·~f.: ~. irst \vnrheitd
count$* tH~·~ : nHi.t~~tt~Y:': ~·t!dh~lrltt' · ttt@ 1H11 t':iiobflbility over \vhn:t
would exist ·if th~r~ wet-e \· no ft•a.tricid~. lh June 1981, while
in the Pentagbn, I fbuld lhe · Aii Fore~ ~~ople nrguing ~gainst

the importance of fratricide. · Thus, .· ! wa~ . most surprised
nine months later to learn that .. they us~ fratricide to ju~tify
Dens~ Pack.
·
·
·
More fundamentally, the Joint Chiefs themselves ilavE:? undercut
~he . ~arg~m..~,nt. ·~-~~t ....!,he . So~ letq ..mqy ntJe.~pt_ .. ~ .f :trst . ~.t.r.ike on
ttte·1111nutemen. · "To my sutprise, I found the following sentences
in t.he 1983 Military Posture Statement on page 21 in the upper
right corner:
"Analyses p:rojeet thnt a Soviet strike ng~tinst US missile
fields could dN::l:rny :i. mn,1nr po1·tion of t.lin T.18 !Cm! forcr'!
if the US chooHos to ride out the attn.ck before responding.
However, the SovictR would Atill hnvo to contend with the
US SLDM forcc--sccurc nnd survivable nt sc~--nnd the
manned bombers that had been launched for survival ~t the
first confirmed warning of attack."
The Soviet leaders would have to assume· thnt we would ride ou't
the attack and not launch on warnin~ eve~ though the itinutcmen
have been designed from the beginning to be lnunchcd very
quickly. They would have to trust us completely , even though
in past y8ars the Anr1un.l Report of the Secretary of_Q.c::J.cr1s~
has Stttt'ect-that Wi:? Wottrd t1ot say \IJT\efncr t)r no~t we wotilcl launch
on warning. Having known this for mttny yen.rs, it has been a
continual puzzle to me as to how the non could have convincC!d
so many people that the Soviets may strike the Minutemen.
The Joint Chiefs add a second fundnm~ntal ptoblcim for thu
Soviet leadership. They would have to assume beyond a shadow
of n doubt that we would not respond with our submarines and
. . bombers. through the above stu t em en ts, the Jo int Chiefs have
shown why the ~IX is not needed as a re ta 1 ia tory ' wen.pen.
I ts
only use can be in a FIRST STRIKE.
A major argument against a Soviet first strikq on the? ~linut8men
has been that there is ~~rcat uncertainty. In the Spring 1982
· issu~ of Strategic Review, General Robert T. Marsh states:

"To the extent thnt ..uncertainty discuurn.gcs u first-strike-::
d~cision,

it iR rortunuto thnt uncortninly nbountls in

this dangerous world wherein the strategic balance
on ·mutual dctci·rencc."

re~ts

Yet, he goes on to !:>UY tha.t' we must tn.ke into 'account t110 cn.pn.bility
o~ the adversary, implying that there is .a chnnce the Soviets
could succc~d even ln ti1c face of i;i·c:it un~crL:.duty .

...

I
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Until a fe\v rnonths . n.~o •it ~ :.felt that urtc~tt,tittty of t he outcome
of ttn ul\tes.tiible mtt!:s.: 11l~:e8.bkil.~a :fir~t sti4i~~L.i;.w6ttld bt:! suf:f icient
to stay ,ti1~ ~· hili1d~~:r.~.,:i.if'Y:·:pote. tit·.inl;Jtttit:::1.eker:a~ nu t now:nt .nm, not
so ~·!:ur~~~t;.t*L~§:t ;~;J\li'~~·L'::_ t.\'wn~'.: : :tsk.ed.''.it~~.. i·@v1~"-~;.a·. ptlp~X' B'ii. the ..
Directb11-' bf· Sttll."'tett:i'c!'• Aha1Ysis· of·~: tR~' tUJM' ·~6tbora t ibti i br ,. Estt?s.
The theme of his :b~P~t .wn~ thai the di~dU~~ibri of missile
vulnerabilit~ h~s ral~ed the !ssu@ of une~rthinty to major
strategic itnportarice 1 implying that · it haciri c1 t been und that it
should be. He ga~s bn to say th~t . if it 1~ accepted that we
should take into account uncertainty in our own force asses~
ments 1 we should likewise take into account the unc~~tainties
the So~iets would face in their strategic ~lnnning . In October !
I received two papers ftom a former Air Force Col. Rane, indicating
th~t he hnd been trying for years to get the senior plann~rs to
understand probability and that computer sirn'u l::i.tions cannot be
trusted for guidance in strn. tegic plnnnirtg, but may · be quite
misleading~
There is a real yearning for bertninty in an
uncertain world. Thus statements such as "the Soviet SS-18
has a 93 percent kill 'probnbility n~ninst tho Mi nutemen silos."
There is a.bsolu tely nd' wny to n.tr i ve u t sue h n stat etnen t.
If
1

hnd teRted mnny flr~t strikes, thq most anc could . ~ivc would
bo n rnnge of kill probnbiliti~s bnscd on ~ certnln prostuted

on~

level of confidence. Without tests, such probability stn.ternents
are either lies or ignornncc.
The gen~rnls know that you cn.ri't fight a nuclear war. Gen.
,,
David Jones said so upon his retirement. Gunernl Marsh, in the
abovementioned issue of Strntcglc Review acknowledges the snme
in the last pnrn.grn.ph of his rebuttal. After reading Willinrn
_,.,..,-·-·~Sh.Q?:'.Q~~~Qle~'With : En~ugh Shuve:l:s" I ~enme . int:-rl!'t!Sfrq:rly .• -. •
convinced that the civilian leadership is taking ~ pafh that
the military leader$hfp would not advise. I·f they have convinced
themselves und almost ·avcryonc else thnt the Soviets may strike
f lrst nt otir ~nnd-bnsed rcmls, they must conclud~, believing
also in our ·superior technology, that we could do the same to
them nnd ought to obtain that crtpaDility. In such nn environ'/ ment, uncertaiuty gives way to certn.Jrtty--only theh cn.n one
· believe that we could limit our losses to an ncceptable level ~
by striking first. As Franklin Spinney commented, "honest
critic ism gets conrt'.iscd with disloyn.l ty. '! In s uch an u tmosphere·
the most bizzare and hawkish views prcvn.il.

Anderson
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